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Collective Identities and Citizenship 
Abstract: In the following I tI)' to show that there is an attractive notion of citizenship 
which is independent of any kind of collective identity. Citizenship is understood as one 
fonn of social interaction. It is argued that in order to understand social interaction ade-
quate1y, it is necessary to introduce a structuraJ. theory ofpractical rationality, to the extent 
this conception of citizenship is based on the theory of structuraJ. rationality. 
1. Collective Identities 
I will not try to define what a collective identity iso For our purposes it should 
suffice to name some necessary ingredients of collective identities, some essential 
characteristics, or - to put it in a methodologically less misleading way - it 
should suffice to name conditions which must be fulfilled by a set of persons in 
order to make it possibleto attribute a collective identity to this set. 
There are four minimal requirements for a set of persons to form a collective 
identity: 
(1) We-intentions form their behaviour to a certain degree.1 
(2) The persons out of this set share a common conception 0/ the good. There are 
common ideas about a good life. Abstractly speaking, the individual value 
functions share some common traits (value functions in the sense decision 
theory allows to attribute if certain conditions of coherence of preference are 
fulfilled). 
(3) The persons out of this set perceive the collective they form with each other as 
a quasi-person: they perceive the collective as having interests, heing able to 
act, competing with other collectives, having ahistory to tell etc.2 
(4) There is common knowledge concerning (1), (2), (3). 
I 'We-Intentions' in the sense R. Tuome1a has introduced and discussed them in detail 
during the last decade, cf. Tuome1a 1984, chap. 2 and chap. 5; 1989,471-496; TuomelaJ 
Miller 1985,26-43; Leist 1985,180-205, andNida-RQmelin 1986, 96-108. 
2 Whether it is constitutive for a collective identity that other persons outside the collec-
tive perceive it as a quasi-person, too, is an interesting question. I personally think that 
internalism is adequate regarding individual persons (only I myse1fknow for sure whether 
I fee1 pain or not etc.). In analogy there might be collective identities which nobody outside 
perceives as such. One should not tI)' to defme collective identities by behaviourist criteria. 
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The nineteenth century notion of citizenship requiring anation state has all 
these ingredients of a collective identity. The Hobbesian ideal of an (almost) 
unlimited sovereignty of state power and its implications such as the principle of 
non-intervention in international affairs, have become an essential part of this 
notion which in the realm of political practice is still quite influential .if one 
regards recent history. The Hobbesian ideal of the state as a quasi-person can 
easily be transformed into a democratic one if one requires additionally certain 
rules of aggregating individual preferences to state preferences. 3 Multiculturalism 
in some versions at least tends to prolong this identity notion 0/ citizenship in 
segregating the unitarian ideal into many different collective identities loosely 
bound together by some structural framework of institutions. Citizenship means 
belonging to one of these collective identities. Individual identity is to a certain 
degree constituted by the respective collective identity.4 
In the following I will concentrate on the relation between the theory ofpracti-
cal rationality and the notion of citizenship in order to discuss the role and status 
of collective identities within such a notion. 
2. Structural Rationality5 
Traditional rational choice theory is based on a consequentialist notion of practi-
cal rationality which is still the predominant view if not in philosophy, then at 
least in social sciences in the English speaking scientific community. The conse-
quentialist notion of practical rationality has a certain intuitive attraction because 
at least in modem society humans understand themselves as actively changing the 
conditions in favour oftheir own well-being. An act is chosen for its consequences 
and persons are responsible concerning actions in the sense of being responsible 
for its consequences.6 Modem decision theory seemed to back up the consequen-
tialist notion of practical rationality in showing that coherence of preferences 
make it possible to attribute a utility function which is maximized by acting in 
3 The fact that there are severe limitations to any kind of democratic aggregation as 
collective choice theory - cf. the Arrow-, Sen- and the GibbardlSatterthwaite-results - has 
shown, till now has not successfully eliminated this notion of citizenship, cf. my 1991a, 
184-203; Arrow 1963, chap. Y.; Sen 1970, chap. 6 and chap. 6*; Gibbard 1973, 587-601; 
Schmeidler/Sonnenschein 1978,227-234; KernlNida-Rümelin 1994, chap. 3, chap. 5 and 
chap. 11. 
4 Interestingly enough there is a common element in libertarianism and these versions of 
multiculturaiism, cf. Nozick's sketch of a libertarian utopia in. the 3rd part of Anarchy, 
State and Utopia, New York 1976. 
5 The background of this conception is the critique of consequentialist notions of 
rationality I developed in 1993a. 
6 Certainly there are more or less sophisticated versions of this idea of responsibility. 
Even the early legal systems leamed soon that an actor can not be held responsible for 
every consequence of one ofhis actions but only for the foreseeable ones. So there emerged 
more subjectivist notions of responsibility without changing the basic consequentialist 
approach. 
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accordance with these preferences. That coherence does not imply consequen-
tialist rationality, as the traditional interpretation of the utility theorem states (cf. 
Luce/Raiffa 1957, chap. 2 and appendPt 1), has no immediate evidence in its 
favour. Consequentialism understands acting as a way of changing the world. To 
choose an action means to change the world in acertain way. Since our knowl-
edge about consequences is limited, choosing actions means to accept a certain 
lottery of worlds. Maxjmizing expected value of consequences, is the Bayesian 
answer to limited knowledge. Bayesian consequentialism is the traditional inter-
pretation of the rational choice approach. 
The behaviour of persons and groups in a society exposes different rank orders 
of possible worlds as the ultimate consequences of action. This multitude of inter-
personally different rank orders causes problems of coordination and especially 
cooperation in a society. From a consequentialist point ofview it is the task of an 
institutional framework to provide some basic restraints in order to make social 
cooperation possible. The traditional view of rational choice takes the system of 
sanctions based on an institutional framework as the only way to change the 
outcomes of individual and group behaviour such that social cooperation is guar-
anteed. But if one takes this claim seriously and thioks of the characteristics such 
. an institutional framework should have to fulfiU this task, i. e. to force conse-
quentialist optimizers to cooperate because cooperation now has become the strat-
egy which maximizes the individual (or group-)preferences over outcomes (resp. 
the rank order over possible worlds), it becomes clear that such an institutional 
framework would be quite horrible. 
The structures of everyday interaction show that sanctions play a minor role 
for providing cooperative behaviour. If somebody begs me to elose the door, I 
elose the door usually because she begged me to do it and not because I am afraid 
I will be 'punished' in one way or the other if I don't. In general I tell what I think 
to be true not because I fear the disadvantages I might face if it turns out that I 
lied. A careful analysis of everyday discourse would certainly show that there is a 
complex system of rules of interaction whiCh are followed for theil' own sake and 
not because not following them is sanctioned in one way or the other. It might be 
that we learned to follow these rules as kids in being sanctioned if we didn't, but 
this does not mean that we follow the rules because the outcomes of actions are 
determined by sanctions. The Gricean idea to differentiate between logical infer-
ence rules and implicatures7 and likewise the approach of discourse ethic to base 
moral validity on rules which we implicitly follow (or accept) in communicating 
(Habermas 1983), allow for some insight into the complexity of the system of 
constitutive rules of interaction and especially cooperation. Grice and Habermas 
share the common conviction that social interaction is linguistically constituted. 
Linguistic analysis can in fact show convincingly that social interaction in general 
and cooperation specifically is constituted by rule conformity for its own sake. 
Communication would immediately break down if a miniihal degree of rule 
conformity were no longer be realized (see Lewis 1975, 3-35). 
7 Cf. Grice 1975,41-58, and the paper ofStrawsonIWilsonlSperberlHintikka 1986. 
Collective Identities and Citizenship 123 
To a high degree we act in conformity to rules. Rules are necessary not only 
for social interaction but also for coordinating one's own life with its different 
social roles, values, competing obligations and projects. Even more a certain rule 
conformity is constitutive for action itself in the sense that the identification of 
action is constituted by mIes. There is a possible 'intellectualist' misunderstand-
ing: these mIes govern behaviour, but the acting persons do not intentionally 
follow these mIes in general. The plurality of reasons persons have for their 
actions displays the system of mIes their behaviour is based on, but it is not iden-
tical with some adopted normative framework. Following mIes does not imply 
knowing the mIes one conforms to. Only some parts of this system of rules have 
found its way into our everyday language. Rules like truthfulness, promising, 
warning and all the other objects of speach act analysis might be named here. But 
there are hints, there are gestures, there is a wide range of nonverbal behaviour 
which follows mIes, too, and which in general has not found its way into our eve-
ryday language. In philosophical discourse there is a usage of the term "institu-
tion" which covers all these elements ofthe system ofmIes governing social inter-
action. If one does not associate explicitness and temporal invariance with this 
term, it can help for our task to introduce a notion of citizenship insofar as the 
term already indicates the close connection between social interaction in general 
and politically explicitly institutionalized interaction as it is constitutive for 
citizenship. 
Intentional behaviour is governed to a high degree by the motivation to be in 
conformity with certain structures of acting. Only if Iassurne that in general one 
should be truthful, do I have good reason to tell the truth even in cases where I 
may have a personal advantage not to tell the truth. I favour a certain rule if I take 
the conformity to this rule as a good reason.On the other hand it can be shown 
that even a person who is interested only in her own well-being, fares better if she 
acts in conformity to certain rules. Optimizing one's own (longterm) well-being by 
every singular act would neither maximize well-being collectively nor even indi-
vidually (see my 1993a, part 4). For this reason, even a merely consequentialist 
notion of practlcal rationality has to be enriched by structural elements in order 
not to be individually or collectively self-defeating (cf. Parfit 1986). I personally 
think that the first step towards a structural version of optimization requires a 
'second step' towards a deontological theory of the good. If something is done not 
because it has best consequences but because it fits into a structure which has best 
consequences, being in conformity to a certain structure gains intrinsic value. The 
theory of the good can not be confined to values independent from the structural 
traits of life-forms, modes of interaction and social cooperation in general. Even if 
one begins in assuming some theory ofthe (extramoral) good as simply given, the 
next step in the argument is to accept structural traits as instruments of value 
maximization. Since a rational person under normal circumstances does not 
choose structures in general but only singular acts, these acts are not chosen as 
mere instruments for maximizing the good but as parts of a structure which itself 
is maximizing the good. The good cannot be understood as a given entity outside 
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any stmcture of individual and collective action and therefore the primacy of the 
good before the right cannot be defended coherently. 
Persons do many things for their own sake, and among these things there are 
some which cannot be understood as optimizing subjective value (or preference 
fu1fillment). 1 may be truthful for its own sake and not because 1 expect certain 
consequences by being truthful (which 1 favour). The full blown theory of the 
good is constituted by both teleological and deontological traits. Rational action is 
not instrumental for maximizing extemal values, and actions which are not done 
for the sake of maximizing values are not necessarily communicative actions. It is 
an illusion to think that there are two ideal types (or paradigms) of practical 
rationality: strategic rationality and communicative rationality. Instead a mere 
optimizing (strategic) notion of rationality is self-defeating and communicative 
action is but one example of a widespread variety of structurally rational types of 
action. Structural traits are constitutive for practical rationality, and not even in 
economics can one dismiss them since economic optimization, too, depends on 
more basic structures of interaction (among others also on communication), and 
therefore economically rational action can only be optimizing within certain struc-
tural traits - economically rational action is not optimizing straightforward but is 
constrained maximizing, too.8 
3. Citizenship Based on Structural Rationality 
Without some elements constraining individual optimizing, many projects essen-
tial for a good life cannot be realized and the advantage of cooperation in general 
is reduced. Structural rationality can at least partly be based on a system of 
constraining conditions, and this can be provided by a stmctural concept of 
collective rationality. To the extent that such a stmctural concept of collective 
rationality is applied in the theory of democracy, it can be combined with a 
concept well-known from the legal theory of H. L. A. Hart, the concept of secon-
dary rules (cf. Hart 1961, chap. V). 
Primary mies prohibit and command; they grant members of a legal commu-
nity rights and impose duties on them. Secondary mies, on the other hand, 
determine which procedure is to be implemented in a legitimate generation of 
primary mies. The line demarcating primary mies from secondary rules is not 
hard and rigid. Because the law of contract determines in which way new legal 
obligations are generated, Hart subsumes it under the category of secondary rules. 
Primary and secondary rules cannot be understood as two separate, disjunct sets of 
mies, because the generation of rules that direct the correct completion and 
fu1fillment of contracts is itself again bound to secondary rules. The difference 
between primary and secondary mies can better be formulated in the following 
way: One specific mle (or one specific set of rules) is secondary in relation to 
8 I use here the tenn Gauthier introduced ("constrained maximizing"), even ifI think that 
his theory of uniting the optimizing model of rational choice and the rule following model 
does not work, as I tried to show in my 1993b, 53-74. 
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another specific rule (or another specific set of rules). Accordingly, the rules 
emerging from a legal contract are secondary to a legal obligation that implies 
concrete contractual conditions, certain rules given by a political institution are 
secondary to the system of rules by the legal contract, etc. 
Democratic legitimacy is a feature of collective decisions that accord with 
certain secondary rules. It is difficult to say in abstract terms which secondary 
rules are constitutive for a democratic system. As the theory of comparative 
government shows, the empirically realized variety of such secondary rule systems 
in parliamentary democracies is very wide. Tbe farnily resemblance between all 
different kinds of democratic systems involve, on the one hand, a minimal 
measure of formalized control of the political decision-makers and, on the other 
hand, a constitutive role for an informal normative consensus. While the first of 
these elements manifests itself in rules of common, fair and free citizens' elections 
guaranteed by constitutions and internal democratic structures within the respec-
tive system of political institutions, the second element of a democratic system is 
essential for the specific normative character of its political decision-procedures: 
The decisions made in these procedures depend on the presupposition of being at 
least fundamentally capable of achieving common consensual agreement. 
Citizens' consensus - even if never in fact realized - is indispensably intentio 
recta for primary rules issued by the legislator. Legislative projects are universal-
istically justified }Vith normative arguments like the common interest, political 
justice, economic efficiency, etc. 
The universalistic justification of primary rules is essential in a democratic 
polity. The claim of universal justifiability of primary rules - a claim towards 
which every kind of communicative political acting in a democratic order must 
necessarily be orientated - does not mean a claim for a de facta common agree-
ment on them. A dissent over primary rules, typically appearing in different 
cognitivistically formulated opinions about the adequacy of specific (universal-
istically intended) normative criteria, cannot, as a rule, be eliminated by a 
democratic decision-procedure. This is simply due to the fact that a democratic 
system is based on a common consensus of a higher order, and this common 
consensus itself refers to the acceptance of secondary rules. At the level of primary 
rules common agreement is intentio recta. At this level, however, de-facto 
common agreement cannot be realized. 
Citizenship in democratic systems is constituted by a basic social consensus 
concerning the structural framework of secondary rules which determine under 
which constraints and with which procedures individuals' first order preferences 
should be realized. Structural features of interaction and collective decision 
constrain individual optimization. 0nly within the structural framework which 
constitutes democratic citizenship is there room left for - not necessarily self- or 
group-oriented - optimization. Optimization is constrained by structural features 
of a democratic order even if optimization is itself oriented towards universalistic 
normative goals, e. g. political justice. 0nly where the democratic character of a 
social structure as such becomes dubious, will the obliging character of its consti-
tutive structural traits (secondary rules) also be questioned. In this case the crite-
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rion of optimization becomes dominant, and a Hobbesian helium omnium contra 
omnes (in terms of either conflicting interests or conflicting normative orienta-
tions) will only be prevented by achieving a new basic consensus on the funda-
mental features of the social structure as a whole. 
Democratic citizenship should not be based (qua aggregation) on the reduc-
tionist constitution of a collective actor, but on structura1 features of interaction -
constituted above all by secondary rules including the features of democratic 
decision-procedures. But for the establishment of structural rationality a system of 
formal rules of interaction and collective decision secured by means of penalties 
can never be sufficient: Structura1 rationality as a personal guideline of praxis is 
indispensable as a normative and motivationally effective element in order to 
constitute citizenship as the corpus-politicum of a democratic order. 
4. Structural Rationality and the Common Good 
One essential feature of the theory of structural rationality is that, according to it, 
social cooperation is not based on a common good which is jointly maximized. 
The divergence of individual optimization on the one band and collective rational-
ity on the other in problematic social situations (the Prisoners' Dilemma as ~the 
paradigm for this type of situations) can be solved - and is in fact solved - not in 
changing the valuations of possible outcomes, but in conforming to certain rules 
of cooperation.9 But if one dogmatically adheres to a consequentialist theory of 
practical rationality and a consequentialist ethic, then social cooperation and 
stable institutional frameworks can be understood only as the result of a preva-
lence of the common good, i. e. of common values maximized individually. 
Although this might be realized sometimes and in these cases seeming coopera-
tion has in fact been transformed into individual optimization, there is. the alter-
native of genuine cooperation, which is a miracle only if you adhere dogmatically 
to consequentialism. Those who think dfAxelrod (Axelrod 1981; 1984; 
Hegselmann 1993) here, who is widely assumed to have shown that in general 
there is a convergence of individual optimization and cooperation, should recall 
that cooperation came about only under some extreme assumptions. One is that 
the probability of this interaction being the last one between the two players is 
below 0,3 %! So 333 interactions can be expected. This is quite an extreme 
assumption except if you are a married or an unmarrled couple. 
This notion of citizenship, based on the idea of structural rationality, is 
perfectly independent of any kind of collective identity. There is no need for 
collective quasi-persons (not even for rules of aggregation - even if I personally 
think that one component of a normatively convincing notion of citizenship is the 
welfare state, and this certainly implies some weak form of aggregation), no need 
even for state sovereignity and a fortiori no need for competing collective actors as 
the 19th century idea of the nation-state assumed and strongly contextualist 
versions of multi-culturalism assume presently. The reality of a multi-cultural 
9 I argue for this in 1991b. 
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society in my view is a good reason for a paradigm-change: from identity-versions 
of citizenship to structural ones. A structural understanding of citizenship will 
weaken collective identities and to me this· seems to be an attractive feature of 
citizenship based on structural rationality. 
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